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AN UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF A REASONABLE STANDARD: TITLE VII AND SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION RETALIATION 
 
JORDEN COLALELLA* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Sexual orientation occupies a twilight zone in the area of employment 
discrimination. As a result, courts have applied varying interpretations of Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision to cases involving sexual orientation discrimination. In the 
quintessential retaliation scenario, an employer discriminates against an employee, the 
employee complains about it, and that complaint results in the employee’s termination or 
demotion.1 Title VII specifically forbids employers from engaging in this practice.2 
There is a very real possibility that an employee’s complaint about sexual 
orientation discrimination could severely affect that employee’s livelihood, resulting in 
                                                 
* Indiana University, Maurer School of Law, J.D. 2013. I would like to thank the members of the Indiana 
Journal of Law & Social Equality for their help in bringing this paper to completion. Also, special thanks to 
Professor Deborah Widiss for providing excellent feedback and support, and for inspiring my interest in 
employment discrimination law. 
1 See, e.g., Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., 107 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing Title VII as making it 
unlawful to discriminate against an employee for opposing a practice made unlawful by Title VII); EEOC v. 
Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 1997) (defining the prima facie case for retaliation claims); 
Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a claimant must demonstrate that 
she engaged in protected activity, experienced an adverse employment action following that activity, and that 
causation existed between protected activity and adverse employment action). 
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, . . . to discriminate against any 
individual . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, 
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” (emphasis added)). 
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termination, decrease in pay, or loss of privileges.3 An individual who complains of 
discrimination faces the danger of being viewed as a “problem employee” and may face 
consequences for complaining. The purpose behind the antiretaliation provision is to ensure 
that employers do not respond to employees’ complaints by firing or demoting them.4 This 
encourages employees to report instances of discrimination without fear of repercussion and 
discourages employers from discriminating in the first place.5 Refusing to recognize 
retaliation claims where an employee was fired for opposing sexual orientation 
discrimination frustrates this purpose, and courts should not dismiss these cases outright. 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 2011) (involving a gay plaintiff who visited 
human resources and filed a complaint for sexual orientation discrimination and was terminated from his 
employment less than 48 hours later); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp., 224 F.3d 701, 703 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(involving a homosexual male nurse working at a hospital who alleged that he was fired by his employer after 
having complained about harassment because of his sexual orientation); Martin v. Dept. of Corr. Servs., 224 
F. Supp. 2d 434, 447 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (involving a homosexual department of corrections officer who alleged 
he was increasingly harassed by co-workers, had his weapons privileges restricted, and lost time and wages 
after he complained about being harassed regarding his sexual orientation); Ianetta v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 142 
F. Supp. 2d 131, 133 (D. Mass. 2001) (involving a plaintiff who was threatened with termination after 
inquiring with human resources about the company’s policy regarding sexual orientation discrimination). 
4 See Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that the purpose behind 
the antiretaliation clause of Title VII is “to protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided by Congress 
to protect his rights” and that “[t]he Act will be frustrated if the employer may unilaterally determine the truth 
or falsity of charges and take independent action.”). 
5 See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1996) (holding that “maintaining unfettered access to 
[Title VII’s] statutory remedial mechanisms” is the primary purpose of the retaliation clause.); McMenemy v. 
City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that “Title VII protects an employee from any 
employer, present or future, who retaliates against him because of his prior or ongoing opposition to an 
unlawful employment practice or participation in Title VII proceedings.”); Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1005 (noting 
that the purpose of the antiretaliation clause is “to protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided by 
Congress to protect his rights.”); Ghirardelli v. McAvery Sales & Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that “[p]ermitting employers to discriminate against an employee because of an 
employee's past use of Title VII’s remedial mechanisms could significantly deter employees from engaging in 
such proceedings.”). 
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Unfortunately, because sexual orientation is not explicitly included in Title VII,6 courts are 
in disarray as to the result when the employer fires an employee for complaining about 
discrimination that is clearly the result of the employee’s sexual orientation.7 
Most circuits have held that the antiretaliation provision in Title VII does not extend 
to sexual orientation; thus the plaintiffs in these cases generally cannot establish the 
elements of a prima facie case.8 A small minority of circuits has held that a plaintiff may 
establish a prima facie claim for retaliation when the underlying discrimination is because 
                                                 
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail 
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”); See also Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th 
Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (holding that “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals”); Blum 
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that “discharge for homosexuality is not 
prohibited by Title VII”); Kelley v. Vaughn, 760 F. Supp. 161, 163 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that “[b]ecause 
homosexuality pertains to sexual preference, and not to gender, ‘Title VII does not prohibit discrimination 
against homosexuals.’”). 
7 See infra Part II. 
8 See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting an 
employee’s retaliation claim because he had not shown discrimination because of sex); Hamner, 224 F. 3d at 
707 (holding that because Title VII does not include sexual orientation as a protected category for the 
purposes of antidiscrimination, it follows that protections for retaliation cannot extend to sexual orientation 
either); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
plaintiff did not have a reasonable belief that his conduct was protected by Title VII); Ianetta, 142 F. Supp. 2d 
at 135 (holding that because complaining about sexual orientation discrimination is not statutorily protected 
activity, the plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails to make out a prima facie case based on sexual orientation, but 
there remains a retaliation claim on sexual stereotyping protected by gender discrimination.). 
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of sexual orientation.9 These courts have allowed retaliation claims to proceed to the 
merits.10 
The circuits are fractured because they differ on the very narrow question of whether 
it is reasonable for an employee to believe that his or her sexual orientation would be 
protected by Title VII. Following the Supreme Court’s holding in Clark County School 
District v. Breeden,11 nearly all of the circuits have adopted a reasonable standard with 
respect to retaliation.12 In order to state a claim for retaliation, an employee must reasonably 
believe that the conduct that prompted the complaint is protected by Title VII.13 To be 
“reasonable,” a claim must be subjectively reasonable, meaning it is sincere and in good 
faith, and objectively reasonable.14 While it is clear that the subjective requirement is 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Dawson, 630 F.3d at 936–37 (holding that complaining to human resources about sexual 
orientation discrimination was protected activity under Title VII, and a decision on the merits was not 
foreclosed.); Martin, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 447–51 (holding that it was reasonable for an individual to believe 
that discrimination because of sexual orientation was actionable under Title VII, and therefore may establish a 
prima facie case for retaliation.). 
10 See, e.g., Dawson, 630 F.3d at 937. 
11 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam). 
12 See, e.g., Brannum v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 518 F.3d 542, 547 (8th Cir. 2008); Stone v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 
279 F. App’x 821, 823 (11th Cir. 2008); Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006); Lang v. 
Nw. Univ., 472 F.3d 493, 495 (7th Cir. 2006); Darmanin v. S.F. Fire Dep’t, 46 F. App’x 394, 395 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
13 See supra note 12; see also Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (denying relief to an 
employee who had no reasonable belief that the conduct complained of was made unlawful under Title VII). 
14 See, e.g., Armstrong v. K & B La. Corp., 488 F. App’x 779, 782 (5th Cir. 2012); Guimaraes v. SuperValu, 
Inc., 674 F.3d 962, 977–78 (8th Cir. 2012); Bryant v. U.S. Steel Corp., 428 F. App’x 895, 898 (11th Cir. 
2011); Moore, 461 F.3d at 341; Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2006); Hamner v. St. 
Vincent Hosp., 224 F.3d 701, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2000); Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1994); Rodas v. 
Town of Farmington, 2013 WL 178152, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2013); Grosdidier v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. 
Of Governors, 774 F. Supp. 2d 76, 108 (D.D.C. 2011); Zimpfer v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs., LP, 795 F. Supp. 
2d 1249, 1253 (D. Utah 2011); Figueroa Garcia v. Lilly Del Caribe, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 193, 208–09 (D.P.R. 
2007). 
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tantamount to a good faith requirement,15 the objective requirement is patently more 
obscure. Even though most courts have essentially equated objectiveness with knowledge of 
Title VII,16 some courts have taken a more nuanced approach that considers the confusion 
surrounding the distinction between sex and sexual orientation. Adding to the confusion is a 
patchwork of state laws that provides some protections against sexual orientation 
discrimination.17 Such courts have not required lawyer-like knowledge of Title VII for 
plaintiffs to recover. 
The blurry line between sex and sexual orientation should compel courts to rethink 
equating reasonableness with knowledge of Title VII. The purpose of the antiretaliation 
statute is not met through a narrow interpretation of the meaning of “objectively 
reasonable.” Reworking the application of the retaliation standard would be a conservative 
modification to the law surrounding retaliation, and is consistent with both the policy of 
Title VII’s prohibition on retaliation and the Supreme Court’s interpretation and application 
of the antiretaliation provision. 
Changing the application of the retaliation statute is an approach that has been 
hinted at in academic scholarship. Deborah Brake’s influential article, Retaliation,18 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Moore, 461 F.3d at 341 (holding that “the employee must hold an objectively reasonable belief, 
in good faith, that the activity opposed is unlawful under Title VII”); Crumpacker v. Kansas Dept. of Human 
Res., 338 F.3d 1163, 1171 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that claims on the basis of an unreasonable good-faith 
belief that the underlying conduct violated Title VII are without merit). 
16 See, e.g., Hamner, 224 F.3d at 707 (7th Cir. 2000). 
17 See infra note 139–43. 
18 Debora L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18 (2005). 
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acknowledges the problems associated with courts’ strict adherence to a narrow 
interpretation of reasonableness. Rote application of the statute fails to address the 
interrelationship between sexual orientation and sex.19 Courts should be flexible in their 
application of the objective standard and should hold that retaliation resulting from a 
complaint about sexual orientation discrimination is actionable. This flexible application of 
what it means for an employee to act “objectively reasonable” would foster better working 
environments by allowing gay and lesbian employees to bring incidents of discrimination to 
the attention of their employers without fear of reprisal. 
In this Note, I argue that the objective standard ought to be revised so as to allow 
remedy for gays and lesbians who suffer from retaliation after filing discrimination 
complaints. Courts will further the policy considerations inherent in the antiretaliation 
provision, by refusing to equate objective reasonableness with knowledge of Title VII. Part 
I of this Note provides an overview of retaliation claims and the analytical framework that 
courts use to interpret these claims. In Part II, the analytical framework and general Title 
VII considerations are applied to sexual orientation. Specifically, Part II includes the 
evaluation of the different approaches courts have taken towards sexual orientation 
retaliation. Part III explains how revising the objectively reasonable standard would better 
reflect the experience of gay and lesbian employees likely to be affected by retaliation. 
Finally, Part IV advocates that courts adopt the new application of the objectively 
                                                 
19 Id. at 93. 
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reasonable standard, and explains why this revision is consistent with, and complementary 
to, the objectives of Title VII. 
I. RETALIATION CLAIMS GENERALLY 
Retaliation claims are one type of claim that may be filed pursuant to the protections 
of Title VII.20 Congress intended the antiretaliation provisions to protect individuals from 
discrimination in instances where they seek to enforce their rights or otherwise oppose the 
discrimination.21 The purpose of the antiretaliation provision is related to, but distinct from, 
the purpose of Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision.22 In Burlington Northern & Santa 
Fe Railway Co. v. White, the Supreme Court explained this distinction, noting that the 
antidiscrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not discriminated 
against because of their race, color, national origin, religion, or sex. The antiretaliation 
provision “seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an employer from 
interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance 
                                                 
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
21 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (holding that the antidiscrimination 
provision of Title VII seeks a workplace where individuals are not discriminated against while the 
antiretaliation provision prevents employers from interfering through retaliation with the Title VII’s 
guarantees). 
22 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”), with Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 
(5th Cir. 1969) (holding that the purpose behind the antiretaliation provision of Title VII is “to protect the 
employee who utilizes the tools provided by Congress to protect his rights” and that “[t]he Act will be 
frustrated if the employer may unilaterally determine the truth or falsity of charges and take independent 
action.”). 
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enforcement of Title VII’s basic guarantees.”23 The antidiscrimination provision prevents 
“injury to individuals based on who they are, for example, their status,” while the 
antiretaliation provision prevents “harm to individuals based on what they do, for example, 
their conduct.”24 As a result of this policy distinction between the two provisions, to win a 
retaliation claim, the plaintiff does not have to prove that the underlying conduct she 
complained about violated Title VII; instead, all that is required is a reasonable belief that 
the conduct violated Title VII.25 The policy concerns surrounding retaliation were further 
expanded in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government.26 The Court in Crawford noted that 
without protection against retaliation, employees would “have a good reason to keep quiet 
about Title VII offenses against themselves or against others.”27 The Court also 
acknowledged the fact that “[f]ear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent 
instead of voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination.”28 
The antiretaliation clause reduces the likelihood that employees will fear reprisals if 
they decide to take advantage of Title VII’s protections. Congress intended to “[maintain] 
unfettered access to [Title VII’s] statutory remedial mechanisms.”29 If an employer can 
discriminate against an employee for having enforced her statutorily protected rights, then it 
                                                 
23 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 63. 
24 Id. 
25 See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (per curiam); see also supra note 15. 
26 555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
27 Id. at 279. 
28 Id. (quoting Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 20 (2005)). 
29 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1996). 
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would have the effect of “significantly deter[ing] employees from engaging in such 
proceedings.”30 If a successful disparate treatment (discrimination) claim is a prerequisite to 
establishing a retaliation claim, the purpose of the antiretaliation clause—“unfettered 
access” to Title VII remedies—would be frustrated because it would deter individuals from 
complaining unless they could be sure that the conduct prompting the complaint violated 
Title VII. Courts have refused to go down that road.31 By not requiring an actual Title VII 
violation in order to proceed with the retaliation clam, courts ensure that employees can 
bring potential discrimination to the attention of their employers without fear of reprisal.32 
The antiretaliation protection incentivizes employers to investigate claims of discrimination 
rather than firing the complaining employee, which furthers Title VII’s general purpose of 
preventing discrimination. 
Courts have come up with a burden-shifting scheme for retaliation claims. There are 
three phases, 33 of which the first phase, the prima facie case, is the most relevant to claims 
                                                 
30 Ghirardelli v. McAvery Sales & Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Title VII protects 
an employee from any employer, present or future, who retaliates against him because of his prior or ongoing 
opposition to an unlawful employment practice or participation in Title VII proceedings.”). 
31 See supra note 15. 
32 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 73 (2006) (noting that the threat of retaliatory 
practice by employer might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a complaint 
of discrimination). 
33 First, the plaintiff begins by establishing a prima facie case. See, e.g., Ackel v. Nat’l Comm., Inc., 339 F.3d 
376, 381 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case 
of retaliation). If the plaintiff can successfully establish all the elements of her prima facie case, she is entitled 
to a rebuttable presumption that she was retaliated against. See, e.g., Pighee v. L’Oreal U.S.A. Prods., Inc., 
351 F. Supp. 2d 885, 894 (E.D. Ark. 2005). Second, the defendant is given the opportunity to rebut this 
presumption. To do so, the defendant must offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for the action that it 
took against the plaintiff. See, e.g., Crossley v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 2004). If the 
defendant has a legitimate reason, the case enters the third phase. The burden again shifts to the plaintiff, who 
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of sexual orientation. To establish the prima facie case, a plaintiff must establish three 
elements, the first of which has been held to bar claims of sexual orientation retaliation. 34 
First, the plaintiff must show that she was engaging in activity protected by Title VII. 
Second, she must show that she was subjected to an adverse employment action. Third, she 
must demonstrate that there is reason to believe that engaging in the statutorily protected 
activity was the cause of the adverse employment action taken against her.35 Additionally, 
some courts require proof that the defendant-employer knew that the plaintiff engaged in 
the protected activity.36 
A plaintiff may satisfy the first prong of the prima facie case by showing that she 
was engaged in statutorily protected activity. Title VII protects two types of activity: 
participation and opposition.37 Participation claims usually involve cases where employees 
have instituted some sort of formal proceedings against the employer.38 Because sexual 
                                                                                                                                                     
must convince the trier-of-fact that the employer’s rationale is pretext. See, e.g., Jimenez v. City of New York, 
605 F. Supp. 2d 485, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
34 See e.g., Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp., 224 F.3d 701, 705, 708 (7th Cir. 2000); see also infra Part II. 
35 See, e.g., Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003) (defining the 
elements required in a prima facie case of retaliation). 
36 See, e.g., Salas v. Wis. Dept. of Corr., 493 F.3d 913, 924 (7th Cir. 2007) (requiring employer knowledge as 
part of the prima facie case); Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 812 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining 
that the causal link prong of the prima facie case is established by knowledge on the part of employer of 
protected activity). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, . . . to discriminate against any 
individual . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, 
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” (emphasis added)). 
38 For example, filing a complaint with the Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is sufficient to establish 
participation. Riley v. Del. River & Bay Auth., 661 F. Supp. 2d 456, 470 (D. Del. 2009) (holding that filing a 
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orientation discrimination is not explicitly included in Title VII, claims of participation are 
of little interest for the purposes of this Note. 
Retaliation cases dealing with sexual orientation discrimination are claims of 
opposition.39 To satisfy the first prong of the prima facie case through a showing of 
opposition, the plaintiff must show that she “opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by [Title VII].”40 This definition brings up two questions: (1) what 
activities constitute opposition; and (2) what practices, if opposed, trigger protection from 
retaliation. The Supreme Court answered the first question in Crawford v. Metropolitan 
Government41 and the second in Clark County School District v. Breeden.42 
After much confusion among the lower courts, the Supreme Court clarified the 
meaning of opposition in its decision in Crawford. The Court recognized that opposition 
does not require active resistance, finding that an employee’s response to an inquiry about 
instances of a supervisor’s inappropriate behavior was sufficient to establish opposition.43 
The Court cited with approval a guideline provided by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
                                                                                                                                                     
claim with the EEOC was sufficient to establish participation, and was protected by Title VII). The source 
does not state this and actually in the footnote talks about the elements of opposition outlined in the paper. 
39 See, e.g., Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2011); Hamner, 224 F.3d 701; Higgins v. New 
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999). 
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
41 555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
42 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
43 Crawford, 555 U.S. at 277−78. In Crawford, the plaintiff claimed that she was terminated because she had 
alleged that she was sexually harassed by her supervisor. She did not initiate the complaint, however. An 
internal investigation had already commenced and she was interviewed as part of the process. A human 
resources official asked the plaintiff if she had ever witnessed any “inappropriate behavior” on the part of her 
supervisor. In response, she described several instances of sexually harassing behavior. Although the company 
took no action against the supervisor, the plaintiff and two other accusers were fired soon after. Id. at 273–74. 
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Commission (EEOC), which defined opposition as including “[w]hen an employee 
communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . . . a form of 
employment discrimination.”44 Crawford stands for the proposition that initiating a 
complaint against an employer is not necessary to satisfying opposition. 
In Breeden, the Court clarified the types of employer practices that, if opposed 
pursuant to the definition in Crawford, would trigger Title VII’s retaliation protections.45 
The Breeden Court rejected the plaintiff’s retaliation claim.46 There, a female employee met 
with her male supervisor and another male employee to review psychological evaluations of 
job applicants. One of the reports showed that an applicant once made a crude comment to a 
co-worker. The comment was repeated, and the male supervisor and the male employee 
made some offhand jokes in reference to the applicant’s comment, offending the female 
employee. She later complained, and argued that her subsequent firing (which occurred two 
years later), was punishment for her filing a complaint.47 The Court noted found that “no 
one could reasonably believe that the incident [she complained of] . . . violated Title VII.”48 
Following the decision in Breeden, a plaintiff’s claim that an employer retaliated against her 
because of her opposition to some employment practice requires that the plaintiff 
                                                 
44 Id. at 276. 
45 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
46 Id. at 274. 
47 Id. at 269–70. 
48 Id. at 270. 
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reasonably believed that the protested conduct was unlawful under Title VII.49 Although the 
Supreme Court did not specifically answer the question of what the plaintiff must prove on 
this issue, nearly all of the circuits have adopted a “reasonable” standard.50 The employee 
must have an objectively and subjectively reasonable belief that the conduct being opposed 
constitutes a violation of Title VII.51 
The second element of the prima facie case is the plaintiff’s showing that she was 
subjected to a materially adverse employment action.52 Title VII forbids an employer from 
“discriminating against” an employee or job applicant because that individual opposed a 
practice made unlawful by Title VII.53 The Supreme Court defined discrimination as a 
materially adverse employment action.54 In order to be materially adverse, the employer’s 
actions must be harmful to the extent that they “might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker 
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”55 
The plaintiff also has to show that her opposition to an employer’s practice was the 
reason for the materially adverse action taken against her.56 Usually the best evidence 
would show the employer’s intent to retaliate or would utilize comparators to support an 
                                                 
49 See supra note 14. 
50 See supra note 15. 
51 See supra note 14. 
52 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006); see, e.g., Daniels v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc, 701 F.3d 620, 637–38 (10th Cir. 2012). 
53 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
54 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 68. 
55 Id. at 68 (citing Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
56 See, e.g., Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 841 (7th Cir. 2012); Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 691 F.3d 119, 131 (2d Cir. 2012); Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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inference that the employer treated the individual differently because of her opposition. In 
the absence of such evidence, a showing that the adverse employment action occurred soon 
after the opposition may be sufficient, at least at the prima facie stage.57 
Finally, the employer must have knowledge that the employee engaged in the 
protected activity.58 Although many courts do not specifically articulate this requirement, it 
is implicit in the other requirements of the prima facie case. An employer cannot retaliate 
against an employee without knowledge of the employee’s conduct.59 
II. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RETALIATION TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
Every circuit agrees that a claim for disparate treatment cannot be based on sexual 
orientation.60 In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff is asserting that the employer 
discriminated against her because of her sexual orientation. The fact that sexual orientation 
is not listed as a protected class by the statute serves to bar these types of claims.61 
                                                 
57 The Supreme Court addressed the issue of causation specifically in Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 
U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam). In that case, the plaintiff relied wholly on temporal proximity of the filing 
of her complaint and her subsequent transfer. The Court intimated that the temporal proximity between the 
protected activity and an adverse employment action must be “very close.” Nearly two years had passed 
between filing of the complaint and the plaintiff’s termination. The Court rejected the contention that a two-
year time delay was probative of causation. Id. 
58 See, e.g., Salas v. Wis. Dep’t. of Corr., 493 F.3d 913, 924 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that a plaintiff must 
show actual knowledge in a case of retaliation). 
59 See id. 
60 See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that “[t]he law is well-settled in this 
circuit and in all others to have reached the question that [an individual] has no cause of action under Title VII 
because Title VII does not prohibit harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation.”). 
61 See id. 
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In contrast to a disparate impact case, in a retaliation case the employee feels 
discriminated against because of sexual orientation, reports the conduct, and is subsequently 
terminated for complaining. Many—though not all—courts have extended disparate 
treatment analysis to claims of sexual orientation retaliation.62 Despite these holdings, 
however, a plaintiff should be able to make out a retaliation claim. That the majority of 
courts hold otherwise frustrates the purpose of the antiretaliation clause.63 
The circuit courts are in disagreement over how to analyze such retaliation claims, 
and most of the circuits hold that those complaining of sexual orientation retaliation cannot 
recover.64 Those courts that do not allow sexual orientation retaliation claims hold that 
because gay and lesbian victims of discrimination cannot state a claim under a disparate 
treatment theory, they cannot state a claim on a retaliation theory either.65 This holding fails 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting an 
employee’s retaliation claim because he had not shown discrimination because of sex); Hamner v. St. Vincent 
Hosp., 224 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that because Title VII does not include sexual orientation as 
a protected category for the purposes of antidiscrimination, it follows that protections for retaliation cannot 
extend to sexual orientation either); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 262 (1st Cir. 
1999) (holding that the plaintiff did not have a reasonable belief that his conduct was protected by Title VII); 
Ianetta v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding that because complaining 
about sexual orientation discrimination is not statutorily protected activity, the plaintiff’s retaliation claim 
must fail because he could not make out a prima facie case). But see, e.g., Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 
928, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that complaining to human resources about sexual orientation 
discrimination was protected activity under Title VII, and a decision on the merits was not foreclosed); Martin 
v. Dep’t. of Corr. Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d 434, 447–48 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that it was reasonable for an 
individual to believe that discrimination because of sexual orientation was actionable under Title VII, and 
therefore a prima facie case for retaliation had been satisfied). 
63 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (“The antiretaliation provision seeks to 
secure that primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an 
employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees.”). 
64 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
65 See supra note 63–64 and accompanying text; see also Hamner, 224 F.3d at 707 (“The plaintiff must not 
only have a subjective (sincere, good faith) belief that he opposed an unlawful practice; his belief must also be 
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to take into consideration the difference between retaliation claims and disparate treatment 
claims. These decisions are at odds with the policy of the antiretaliation statute, and 
Congress’s intent would be better served by victims of this type of retaliation to recover. 
In analyzing sexual orientation retaliation claims, most courts have rejected them at 
the prima facie stage. The retaliation claim is often dismissed,66 the apparent rationale being 
that it is unreasonable for one to believe that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is protected by Title VII.67 However, this analysis is overly simplistic and 
ignores the basic rationale of Title VII. In addition, it misapplies the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Breeden as well as the reasonableness standard that has been adopted in all of the 
circuits. In order to understand the different positions taken by the circuit courts, it is 
necessary to revisit the elements of the prima facie case for retaliation. 
The prima facie case for retaliation is no different in cases involving sexual 
orientation. The plaintiff must have engaged in statutorily protected opposition that caused 
the employer to subject her to a materially adverse employment action.68 However, 
retaliation cases brought by employees claiming that they have been fired for complaining 
                                                                                                                                                     
objectively reasonable, which means that the complaint must involve discrimination that is prohibited by Title 
VII.”) (emphasis added). 
66 See, e.g., Ianetta, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 423 (“As sexual orientation is not protected under Title VII, Ianetta’s 
[complaint] . . . was not a protected activity. The first claim of retaliation, therefore, is without merit and will 
not be further addressed.”). 
67 See supra note 62–63 and accompanying text. 
68 See, e.g., Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003).  
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about sexual orientation discrimination have often not been able to make out these 
preliminary requirements. 
While a “plain language” argument would seem, at least superficially, to foreclose 
an action for retaliation,69 this argument fails in light of the Court’s holding in Breeden as 
well as subsequent lower courts’ interpretations. Courts have long refused to enforce the 
plain language of the provision. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Breeden, an 
employee must only reasonably believe that her opposition to her employer’s conduct 
violated Title VII.70 As a result, the circuit courts have interpreted this to mean that a 
plaintiff has to show that her belief was both objectively and subjectively reasonable.71 The 
rejection of the plain language argument is consistent with the purpose of the retaliation 
provision, which is to encourage employees to bring complaints to their employers without 
fear of reprisal, even if the underlying conduct does not rise to the level of a disparate 
treatment claim. At the same time, the application of the “reasonable” test has led to much 
confusion among the circuits, and it remains unclear whether an employee’s belief that 
                                                 
69 A plain language argument would proceed as follows: The antidiscrimination provision of Title VII does 
not include sexual orientation in its list of protected classifications. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). The 
wording of the antiretaliation provision makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an 
employee for opposing conduct “made an unlawful practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) 
(2006) (emphasis added). Therefore, because sexual orientation discrimination is not made an unlawful 
practice by the subchapter, it is unprotected even in retaliation claims that are made independent of a disparate 
treatment claim. This was the argument utilized in Hamner v. St. Vincent Hospital. 
70 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–71 (2000); see also, Brannum v. Mo. Dep’t. of Corr., 
518 F.3d 542, 547 (8th Cir. 2008); Stone v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 279 F. App’x 821, 823 (11th Cir. 2008); 
Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006); Lang v. Nw. Univ., 472 F.3d 493, 495 (7th Cir. 
2006); Darmanin v. S. F. Fire Dep’t., 46 F. App’x 394, 395 (9th Cir. 2002). 
71 See supra note 14. 
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sexual orientation violates Title VII is reasonable. If the employee did act reasonably in 
opposing the employer’s conduct, then the employee can satisfy her prima facie case. If the 
employee was not reasonable in believing the employer’s conduct violated Title VII, then 
the retaliation claim will fail because she was not able to make out her prima facie case. It is 
also important to note that the reasonableness standard should apply to employees as 
opposed to lawyers, as complaining employees are often acting on their own without the 
assistance of lawyers. 
The major problem with analyzing sexual orientation retaliation claims stems from 
the requirement that the plaintiff show that she has engaged in statutorily protected 
opposition. Those complaining of sexual orientation retaliation can often show a materially 
adverse employment action; in many cases, they can also show causation.72 The Seventh 
Circuit addressed the issue of engaging in protected activity in Hamner v. St. Vincent 
Hospital.73 In that case, the plaintiff complained to the hospital-employer because he felt 
that he was being harassed by his supervisor because of his sexual orientation. Hamner 
alleged that his supervisor harassed him by “lisping at him, flipping his wrists, and making 
jokes about homosexuals.”74 He was fired a few weeks later.75 
                                                 
72 Although the Hamner court did address the merits of plaintiff’s claim, it was the first prong of the prima 
facie case that stood in the way of the plaintiff’s recovery. Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp., 224 F.3d 701, 708 
(7th Cir. 2000). The other prongs, causation and adverse employment action, seemed, at least from the facts, 
to be satisfied. Id. at 703–04. The plaintiff was presumably able to show that he was discriminated against 
because of his sexual orientation, and he was able to show that he had been fired as a result of it. Id. 
73 224 F.3d 701. 
74 Id. at 703. 
75 Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment, 
noting that Hamner was subjected to an adverse employment action on the basis of sexual 
orientation, which is not protected by Title VII.76 More importantly, the Seventh Circuit 
also rejected Hamner’s claim that he reasonably believed that he was opposing an 
employment practice that violated Title VII.77 The plaintiff pointed to the fact that the 
Seventh Circuit, like other circuits, had held that a retaliation claim may proceed past the 
prima facie stage so long as the plaintiff has a “sincere and reasonable belief that he is 
opposing an unlawful practice.”78 In other words, the plaintiff argued that even if the 
challenged practice does not actually violate Title VII, an employee may still engage in 
protected activity under the antiretaliation provision. This is consistent with the policy of 
the antiretaliation statute, which is to ensure that employees who feel discriminated against 
may bring such incidents to their employers without fear of reprisal.79 The Seventh Circuit, 
however, rejected this argument because it requires both that the plaintiff has a subjective, 
good faith belief that the activity he was opposing violated Title VII as well as an 
objectively reasonable belief that this conduct violated Title VII.80 The court noted that 
while Hamner met the subjective requirement, he did not meet the objective requirement 
                                                 
76 Id. at 707. 
77 Id. 
78 Id at 706–707. 
79 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2005); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe 
Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969). 
80 Hamner, 224 F.3d at 707. 
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because sexual orientation is not a protected class under Title VII.81 Essentially, the court 
equated the objective requirement with knowledge of Title VII. Under Hamner, to meet the 
objective requirement, the complaint must involve discrimination that is in fact prohibited 
by Title VII.82 
Not all courts have accepted the conclusion in Hamner. Some have taken a more 
nuanced approach to the objectively reasonable test, refusing to equate objective 
reasonableness with knowledge of Title VII. The Ninth Circuit implicitly addressed this 
issue in Dawson v. Entek International.83 In that case, Dawson, a gay man, alleged that his 
employer had retaliated against him for filing a complaint. In his complaint, he alleged that 
his coworkers and his supervisor made derogatory comments about his sexual orientation.84 
Dawson testified that he had been called a “worthless queer” and had been referred to as “a 
homo, a fag, and a queer.”85 He took his situation to human resources and was fired two 
days later.86 
The facts of this case were similar to the facts of Hamner. Both cases involved a gay 
employee who was discriminated against because of his sexual orientation. Both Hamner 
and Dawson complained about the discrimination, and both were fired shortly after 
                                                 
81 Id.  
82 See id. 
83 630 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2011). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 933. 
86 Id. 
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complaining.87 However, the Ninth Circuit held that Dawson had established a prima facie 
case of retaliation.88 The court noted that “Dawson engaged in protected activity when he 
visited . . . human resources to discuss his treatment and file a complaint.”89 The court 
accepted without further discussion that Dawson had engaged in protected activity by 
opposing the actions of his supervisor and coworkers.90 As a result, Dawson had established 
the prima facie case that had been rejected in Hamner. The Ninth Circuit concluded that 
Dawson had provided sufficient evidence to create a “genuine issue of material fact on his 
claim of retaliation.”91 Unlike the Hamner court, the Dawson court held that a sexual 
orientation retaliation claim is actionable, and remanded the proceedings to the district court 
for further proceedings on the retaliation claim.92 
Similarly, in Martin v. New York Department of Correctional Services,93 the federal 
district court reasoned that the plaintiff had shown that he had engaged in protected activity 
because he met the objective and subjective requirements. In that case, Martin alleged that 
                                                 
87 Compare Dawson, 630 F.3d at 933, with Hamner, 224 F.3d at 703–04. 
88 Id. at 942. 
89 Id. at 936. 
90 Addressing protected activity, the Ninth Circuit noted only that “Dawson engaged in protected activity 
when he . . . visited human resources to discuss his treatment and file a complaint . . . based directly on sexual 
orientation discrimination.” Id. at 936 Although the court in Dawson did not address the issue of 
objective/subjective reasonableness, the Ninth Circuit, like the Second and Seventh Circuits, has adopted a 
standard of “reasonableness.” This standard incorporates the objective/subjective test. In Moyo v. Gomez, the 
Ninth Circuit held that “opposition clause protection will be accorded whenever the opposition is based on a 
‘reasonable belief’ that the employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice.” 40 F.3d 982, 984 (9th 
Cir. 1994). The court continued, noting that reasonableness “must be assessed according to an objective 
standard—one that makes due allowance, moreover, for the limited knowledge possessed by most Title VII 
plaintiffs about the factual and legal bases of their claims.” Id. at 985. 
91 Dawson, 630 F.3d at 942. 
92 Id. 
93 224 F. Supp. 2d 434 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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he was routinely harassed and verbally abused by his coworkers. In addition, Martin’s 
coworkers left sexually explicit pictures in his work area.94 Martin alleged that this conduct 
went on for years. He claimed that he was retaliated against after having complained about 
this conduct to his supervisors.95 Martin was subjected to hostile and offensive sexual 
comments, jokes, and gestures by his coworkers;96 crude and humiliating sexually explicit 
pictures and statements on the bathroom walls, yard booths, and time cards;97 and 
newspaper articles advertising items such as “penile pumps” and “dildos.”98 
The Second Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, adopted both the 
objective and subjective requirements as necessary to establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation.99 The employer in Martin produced a line of argument similar to the argument 
accepted in Hamner. The employer argued that because sexual orientation is not protected 
by Title VII, Martin must have known that his complaint about sexual orientation was not 
protected.100 The Second Circuit, however, rejected the Hamner argument: 
There is no evidence in the record, however, that Martin, a lay person, was 
aware of Second Circuit case law. The State Defendants have also failed to 
proffer any reason why such knowledge should be imputed to non-lawyers. 
                                                 
94 Id. at 441. 
95 Id. 
96 Second Am. Compl. and Demand for Jury Trial at ¶ 14, Martin v. N.Y. Dept. of Corr. Servs., 224 F. Supp. 
2d 434 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 99-CV-1364 (LEK/RWS)). 
97 Id. at 21. 
98 Id. at 22. 
99 See Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat’l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 292 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that 
satisfaction of the prima facie element of protected activity does not require a showing that the opposed 
conduct actually violated Title VII, but rather that the plaintiff reasonably and in good faith believed that it 
did). 
100 Martin, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 448. 
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Accordingly, the State Defendant’s contention is rejected and Martin has 
established the first element of his prima facie case.101 
 
Unlike the Hamner court, the Martin court refused to equate objective 
reasonableness with knowledge of Title VII. Although the underlying conduct was not 
protected by Title VII, Martin was reasonable in thinking that he was opposing conduct 
made unlawful by Title VII. 
III. “REASONABLE” BELIEF THAT SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION VIOLATES 
TITLE VII 
In analyzing the issue of objective reasonableness with regard to retaliation claims, 
the question that courts need to ask is simple: whether it was reasonable for the employee to 
think that sexual orientation is protected by Title VII. The better view is that the purpose of 
Title VII and its subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court imply that it is reasonable 
for an employee to file a complaint with the assumption that sexual orientation is protected. 
The belief that Title VII would protect an employee from sexual orientation discrimination 
is reasonable because (1) sexual orientation shares many of the same qualities as the classes 
that are explicitly protected by Title VII, (2) the Supreme Court and the lower courts have 
blurred the line between discrimination on the basis of sex and discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, and (3) there is a patchwork of state laws that provides some 
protections against sexual orientation discrimination by employers. Additionally, courts 
                                                 
101 Id. 
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should recognize that encouraging gay and lesbian individuals to file a complaint without 
fear of reprisal furthers the purpose of the antiretaliation provision. 
Title VII’s general prohibition on discrimination makes it illegal for employers to 
discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, and sex.102 The same 
factors that led to the inclusion of those classifications make it reasonable, albeit mistaken, 
for an employee to believe that Title VII protects sexual orientation. Like the protected 
classifications, sexual orientation brings up similar issues of innateness and immutability. It 
is at least reasonable for an employee to believe that sexual orientation is just as innate and 
immutable as gender. Therefore, in opposing an employer’s discrimination against gays and 
lesbians, an employee could reasonably believe that he or she would have some sort of 
redress under Title VII. The facts of Dawson, Hamner, and Martin make it clear that 
discrimination because of sexual orientation is a very real problem, and it would be 
reasonable for an employee to file a complaint. Just because the conduct giving rise to the 
complaint does not violate Title VII does not mean that an employee should not be 
protected from being discharged if he or she decides to complain about it. This is especially 
true when the discrimination reaches the severity and pervasiveness that it did in Martin. 
An employee whose coworkers “left sexually explicit pictures in his work area and written 
statements and pictures on the restroom walls, yard booths, his time card and his interoffice 
                                                 
102 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin”). 
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mail”103 could reasonably be expected to complain. His complaint should not be the basis 
for his subsequent termination or demotion. 
For courts to equate objective reasonableness with knowledge that sexual orientation 
is not protected by Title VII is to ignore the Supreme Court’s treatment of gender 
discrimination. Requiring that an employee have knowledge of courts’ esoteric distinction 
between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is a much higher standard 
than the “objectively reasonable” standard. In fact, as evidenced by the circuit split itself, 
even lawyers differ on the question of whether it is reasonable for an employee to believe 
that sexual orientation is protected by Title VII. The standard should be modeled on the 
basis of a reasonably objective employee, not a reasonably objective lawyer practicing 
employment discrimination law. 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of claims of individual disparate treatment on the 
basis of sex—particularly sexual harassment and gender stereotyping—could lead an 
individual to reasonably conclude that she is protected under Title VII. As a result, 
complaining to her employer would be reasonable and should be protected from retaliation. 
Same-sex harassment and gender stereotyping are two areas in particular where the 
Supreme Court has blurred the line between sex, which is protected under Title VII, and 
sexual orientation, which is not. The fact that this distinction is in place argues in favor of a 
more flexible application of Breeden’s reasonableness standard. In both sexual harassment 
                                                 
103 Martin, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 441. 
An Unreasonable Application of a Reasonable Standard 
2013 
250 
 
and gender stereotyping, the distinction between sex discrimination and sexual orientation 
discrimination has a tendency to break down. 
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,104 an apparently straight105 male 
employee brought a Title VII sexual harassment action against his male coworkers and 
supervisors. The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation and held that 
same-sex harassment is in fact actionable as “sex discrimination.”106 The plaintiff worked 
for Sundowner Offshore Services on a platform in the Gulf of Mexico. There, he was 
“forcibly subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions against him by [his coworkers].”107 
The plaintiff was sexually assaulted and threatened with rape.108 He ultimately quit his job 
and filed suit against his employer, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex. The district 
court, which was subsequently affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, held that “Mr. Oncale, a male, 
has no cause of action under Title VII for harassment by male co-workers.”109 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding that nothing in 
Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination merely because the plaintiff and his 
alleged abuser are of the same sex.110 Thus, the Court in Oncale held that same-sex 
harassment is actionable discrimination under Title VII.111 The relevant issue, according to 
                                                 
104 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
105 SHANNON GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY: REALIZING GAY LIBERATION 196 ( 2011). 
106 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. 
107 Id. at 77. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 79. 
111 Id. 
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the Court, is whether the individual was harassed because of his or her sex.112 In the 
opinion, Justice Scalia notes three “evidentiary routes” by which an individual may pursue 
his or her claim of same-sex sexual harassment. The first is credible evidence that the 
harasser was homosexual.113 The second is evidence that a victim was abused by a member 
of the same-sex because of general hostility to the presence of men or women in the 
workplace.114 The third is comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated 
members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.115 A showing of such evidence would be 
considered relevant in making a claim of same-sex sexual harassment.116 The critical issue, 
according to the Court, is “whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous 
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.”117 
The Court’s holding in Oncale is inconsistent with a rigid distinction between sex 
and sexual orientation. The effect of the discrimination tends to be the same, whether the 
discrimination was motivated by sex or sexual orientation. The facts of Oncale are not all 
that different from Martin; in both cases, the plaintiffs were subjected to systematic abuse at 
the hands of their coworkers and supervisors. The Supreme Court did not go so far as to say 
that abuse that is sexual in nature or content is always sexual harassment.118 However, 
                                                 
112 Id. at 79–81. 
113 Id. at 80. 
114 Id.at 80–81. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsberg, J., concurring)). 
118 Id. at 80. 
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based on the Court’s analysis in Oncale, it seems that the sexual content of the abuse is at 
least a substantial factor in considering whether same-sex harassment existed.119 The 
harassment in Martin was of a similar nature.120 A plaintiff in Martin’s position would be 
very likely to rely on the abuse complained of in Oncale as giving rise to an actionable 
complaint under Title VII. This reliance, though technically an incorrect interpretation of 
precedent surrounding Title VII, is at least a patently reasonable one, passing both the 
objective and subjective standards. 
The second category of cases in which courts have blurred the line between sex 
discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is cases involving gender stereotyping. 
While sexual orientation discrimination is not prohibited by Title VII, discrimination on the 
basis of gender stereotypes is prohibited. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,121 the Supreme 
Court held that an employer discriminates on the basis of sex when it requires employees to 
conform to gender norms. Price Waterhouse, a professional accounting partnership, denied 
the plaintiff’s candidacy for partnership. The plaintiff alleged that she was discriminated 
against because she behaved too aggressively. Price Waterhouse had a history of “an 
                                                 
119 Id. at 81–82. 
120 See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text. 
121 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–66, 105 Stat. 
1074–75, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1997). Although Congress superseded 
the Court’s holding with regard to mixed motive analysis, the Court’s interpretation of gender stereotyping 
remains unchanged by any amendment to the statute and is still good law. 
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impermissibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women,”122 and the Court concluded 
that such gender stereotyping was impermissible discrimination on the basis of sex.123 
The Ninth Circuit addressed similar questions in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.124 
The court was presented with the question of “whether an employee who alleges that he 
was subjected to severe, pervasive, and unwelcome ‘physical conduct of a sexual nature’ in 
the workplace asserts a viable claim of discrimination based on sex.”125 In that case, the 
Ninth Circuit held that an employee’s sexual orientation is irrelevant for the purposes of 
Title VII because it “neither provides nor precludes a cause of action for sexual 
harassment.”126 That the harasser was, or may have been, “motivated by hostility based on 
sexual orientation is similarly irrelevant.”127 It was sufficient that the harasser engaged in 
harassment of a sexual nature.128 In addition, as the concurrence notes, such harassment was 
discrimination based on gender stereotyping, which is tantamount to discrimination based 
on sex under Title VII.129 
In Rene, the plaintiff was an openly gay man who alleged sexual harassment by his 
male co-workers and supervisors. His supervisors’ and fellow butlers’ conduct included 
caressing and hugging. Rene alleged that his coworkers often “grabbed him in the crotch” 
                                                 
122 Id. at 236–37. 
123 See id. at 256–58. 
124 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 922 (2003). 
125 Id. at 1063. 
126 Id. at 1063–64. 
127 Id. at 1063. 
128 See id. at 1068. 
129 Id. at 1069 (Pregerson, J., concurring). 
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and “poked their fingers in his anus through his clothing.”130 Rene argued that his sex was 
“a factor in the adverse treatment [he] received.”131 The district court granted MGM 
Grand’s motion for summary judgment, holding that his claim was not actionable because 
he was gay.132 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, citing the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Oncale as applicable to the plaintiff’s claim.133 Relying on Oncale, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that “Title VII forbids severe or pervasive same-sex offensive sexual 
touching.”134 The Ninth Circuit also held that offensive sexual touching is discrimination 
based on sex.135 In a special concurrence, three Ninth Circuit judges argued that this was a 
case of “actionable gender stereotyping harassment.”136 
Relying on the analyses of Price Waterhouse and Rene, gender-stereotyping and 
inappropriate sexual conduct are actionable as discrimination based on sex. Discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation will almost always include these elements. In the same 
way that it is a gender stereotype to expect women to act as though they had taken “a course 
at charm school,”137 it is a gender stereotype to believe that all women are attracted to men 
or that all men are attracted to women. Gay and lesbian individuals simply do not fit into 
                                                 
130 Id. at 1064. 
131 Id.  
132 Id. at 1066. 
133 Id. at 1068. 
134 Id. at 1067. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 1068 (Pregerson, J., concurring). 
137 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). 
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this gender stereotype.138 In addition, on the basis of Price Waterhouse and Rene, it appears 
that the application of the distinction between sex and sexual orientation leads to the absurd 
conclusion that an “effeminate” male employee will be protected under Title VII regardless 
of his sexual orientation (because he does not conform to male stereotypes), but a “straight-
acting” gay male employee will not be protected because he is supposed by courts to have 
conformed to gender stereotypes. The distinction between the “straight-acting” gay male 
employee and the “effeminate” male employee seems to defy both logic and the policy of 
Title VII, which is to prevent discrimination on the basis of sex.139 This strange result 
makes it objectively and subjectively reasonable for the average employee to conclude that 
sexual orientation is protected by Title VII. 
In addition to the problem of distinguishing sex discrimination from sexual 
orientation discrimination, the fact that states vary in their treatment of sexual orientation as 
a protected class further supports that it is reasonable for an employee to believe that sexual 
orientation discrimination is actionable under Title VII. Twenty-one states and the District 
                                                 
138 Andrew Koppelman, for example, has made the argument that sexual orientation discrimination is sex 
discrimination. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.197 (1994). He argues that discrimination because of sexual orientation 
rests upon “normative stereotype[s].” Id. at 219. In particular, the stereotype that certain conduct is 
permissible for one sex but is not permissible for the other. As Koppelman puts it, sex with a woman is 
appropriate for men, but is inappropriate for women. Id. Although his argument is tethered primarily to the 
area of constitutional law, his analysis lends itself to Title VII and employment discrimination. Koppelman 
argues that much of the “stigmatization” of gays and lesbians stems from “the homosexual’s supposed 
deviance from traditional sex roles.” Id. at 234. He notes a “correlation” between “sexism” and 
“heterosexism,” bolstering his argument that sexual orientation discrimination and sex discrimination are 
really two sides of the same coin. Id. at 240. 
139 See generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (holding that the 
substantive provision of Title VII prevents discrimination against employees because of their status). 
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of Columbia protect sexual orientation in their versions of Title VII.140 These statutes 
protect gay and lesbian employees from being discriminated against by their employers. 
These state statutes protect employees in the public and private sector.141 Additionally, nine 
states have an executive order, administrative order, or personnel regulation that prohibits 
discrimination against public employees based on sexual orientation.142 These orders apply 
only to state agencies. Such states allow employees to bring a retaliation claim on the basis 
of sexual orientation.143 Of course, there are less damages available than under federal law. 
In addition, numerous employers prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
in their employment policies, even if they are not required to do so under applicable law.144 
This, too, would make it reasonable for an employee to believe that she would be protected 
if she complained about sexual orientation discrimination. 
Finally, concluding that it would be reasonable for an employee to believe that 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is actionable under Title VII would further 
                                                 
140 Statewide Employment Laws & Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/Employment_Laws_and_Policies.pdf. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 For example, New York law includes sexual orientation in its substantive provision and provides relief for 
retaliatory practices. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 2010) (“[It shall be unlawful] [f]or an employer 
. . . because of an individual’s age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, 
disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, marital status, or domestic violence victim status, to refuse to 
hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such 
individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment”) (emphasis added); N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(e) (McKinney 2010) (“[It shall be unlawful] [f]or any employer . . . to discharge, expel 
or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this 
article . . .”) (emphasis added). 
144 HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2012: RATING AMERICAN WORKPLACES ON 
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 20 (2012), available at 
http://issuu.com/humanrightscampaign/docs/corporateequalityindex_2012. 
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the purpose of the antiretaliation statute. The difference in policy between antiretaliation 
and antidiscrimination is subtle, but vital. The policy underlying antidiscrimination is 
simply to protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, 
religion, or sex.145 The purpose of the antiretaliation statute is to encourage individuals to 
come forward with complaints of discrimination.146 This is why the standard in Breeden 
does not require a meritorious claim under Title VII. An individual can succeed on a 
retaliation claim despite failing on a claim of disparate treatment. If courts hold that sexual 
orientation discrimination would reasonably incite an employee to file a complaint under 
Title VII, then employees that feel discriminated against (or see someone being 
discriminated against) will not have to fear for their jobs just because they happened to be 
wrong about what is actually protected under Title VII. By encouraging individuals to 
complain without fear of reprisal from their employers, Title VII helps to create a more 
harmonious work environment in which employees are not “chilled” from complaining. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower courts have stated that the standard that applies to retaliation cases is a 
reasonable belief that the opposed conduct violated Title VII.147 The test requires both an 
objective and subjective component. Courts should hold that it is objectively and 
                                                 
145 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (noting that the objective of Title VII 
is “to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor 
an identifiable group of white employees over other employees”). 
146 See supra note 4. 
147 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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subjectively reasonable for a gay or lesbian employee to believe that the conduct underlying 
his or her retaliation claim violated Title VII. Courts should explicitly reject the holding in 
Hamner and adopt the holding in Martin. Although Hamner and Martin use the same rule, 
Hamner amounts to an unreasonable application of the reasonable requirement explained in 
Breeden. 
The “objectively reasonable” standard adopted by circuit courts should not be 
applied so as to require that employees have lawyer-like knowledge of the workings of Title 
VII. Requiring a lay employee to understand the Supreme Court’s nuanced distinction 
between discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and discrimination on the basis of 
sex is an untenable standard. The treatment of same-sex harassment and gender 
stereotyping, as well as the array of state antidiscrimination statutes and employer policies 
have complicated the legal status of sexual orientation. Taken together, these complications 
make it quite reasonable for an ordinary employee to believe that the law protects her from 
sexual orientation discrimination. A mistaken belief that sexual orientation discrimination is 
unlawful under Title VII satisfies both the subjective and objective components of the 
reasonableness standard, and it is therefore reasonable. The subjective component is met as 
long as the complaint is made in good faith, and the objective test is met because of the 
immense confusion surrounding the treatment of sexual orientation under Title VII. Courts 
should recognize the standard as met, and hold that a plaintiff can make a prima facie claim 
of retaliation even where the opposed conduct is discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
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Sexual orientation claims should follow the same burden-shifting scheme as a retaliation 
claim made on the basis of race or sex. 
The purpose of the anti-retaliation provision is to encourage employees to file 
complaints against offending employers.148 If employers can retaliate against employees for 
filing these sorts of complaints, this purpose is frustrated. Because the validity of a 
retaliation claim is a separate issue from the incident giving rise to the complaint, the 
antiretaliation provision does not require that the plaintiff have a meritorious discrimination 
claim to win on the retaliation claim—only a reasonable belief that the employer violated 
Title VII is required. An employee acts reasonably, subjectively and objectively, when he or 
she complains about sexual orientation discrimination. As a result, the employee should be 
protected from retaliation. 
                                                 
148 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (noting that the primary purpose of the antiretaliation 
statute is “maintaining unfettered access to Title VII's remedial mechanisms”). 
